Obligations to Future Generations

Most likely, there will be human beings on Earth for thousands of years to come, and maybe even millions of years. Given this, one question that many in environmental ethics find very important is: What, if any, are our moral obligations to these people?

One way to approach answering this question is to reconsider moral extensionism -- that is, determine if future generations have any kind of moral standing. Obviously, if future people have the same rights as current people, then we have the same set of duties to future people as we do for current people. If the set of rights possessed by future people is thought to be diminished in some way, we need to determine in what way, and by what justification.

This approach, however, has a number of significant problems. In general, these are:

• Can we make sense of the idea that we have duties to non-existent people?
• Even if we have obligations, what would they entail? (What would people in the future have wanted us to do?)
• How do we weigh the interests of current people vs. future people?

Who Cares for Posterity?
Garrett Hardin

Hardin is critical of both standard philosophical and economic approaches to the problem of future generations.

According to Hardin, philosophical approaches to moral issues are inherently individualistic -- that is, focussed on the relations between individuals. Further, that the only relations relevant are those in the 'here and now'. This has the consequence that standard moral theories are not equipped to develop any prescriptions governing behaviour towards future generations. [We should note that Hardin's analysis, here, is rather incomplete. For one thing, some versions of Utilitarianism may well be best understood as not be individualistic in the way that creates the problem Hardin identifies. A version of Utilitarianism that focusses on preferences or interests takes these as being basic, not individual bearers of interests. It may not require any fundamental modification, then, to add the possible interests of future people (though it might be difficult to identify these).]

Standard economic models rely on rational calculations of costs vs. benefits (often buidling in risks as well). The thinking is that we ought to take actions that maximize benefits and minimize costs (in the context of risk assessments). [It's curious why Hardin doesn't see this as Utilitarian.] A problem with simple models that needs to be overcome is that costs and benefits are calculated only at a time, not across time. Economists solve this problem by building in 'discounting for the future'. Any benefit to be received in the future is discounted in various ways, and only then compared to the current costs. Similarly, any cost in the future is discounted, and then compared to the current benefits.

There are a number of problems, though, with performing accurate risk-cost-benefit calculations, especially with respect to our actions that have significant impacts on the environment. One is that it is not always clear what the costs or benefits will be. The case of the High Aswan Dam shows this -- with respect to both costs and benefits. As it has turned out, people were seriously wrong about both.

Hardin is not optimistic about people performing cost-benefit calculations altruistically. Through a series of historical examples, he shows that people tend to shift to radically egoistic behaviour patterns in times of serious stress. The consequence for posterity is that current people will act in order to preserve themselves, here and now, and ignore or override any concerns for the future. However, societies have established institutions to guard against this 'egoism'. Religions and other social structures are established so as to create a group of people who act essentially as guardians of the future. These people must not be under conditions of stress so that they do not fall into the patterns of same egoistic patterns of behaviour of the masses. Rather, they are to be privileged. They are, nonetheless, still behaving egoistically; they egoistically act so as to preserve their privileged positions and so the necessary social structures that guard the needs of the future. It follows, then, that countries ought not to be egalitarian. If they were, there would be no privileged group remaining to guard the needs of posterity.

Hardin makes a further interesting point. In the absence of complete knowledge of political and economic relationships between countries and other groups, we should not attempt to unify the World. Doing so would be analogous to having a monoculture forest -- i.e., one that as a system has no resilience to disease, drought, etc. Just as in ecosystems, diversity is needed for resilience of the system, so to is diversity needed for global political and economic stability, and ultimately, survival. Civilizations have collapsed before. So, we have to suppose that it will likely happen again. If there is only one civilization, collapse ends all civilization.

Martin Golding

Golding argues that our obligations to future generations are, at best, minimal. Before he gets to addressing the issue of the nature of these obligations, Golding provides an analysis of the problem. Three points are made by addressing three interrelated questions.

(1) Who are the future people to whom we have obligations?

First, obligations to future people are, obviously, distinct from obligations to current people. Second, Golding thinks we should exclude, also, our most immediate descendants -- i.e., children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. We share a "common life" with these groups, so must exclude them from considerations about future generations. People who are beyond our immediate decedents are, then, future generations in the relevant sense. We should note here, though, that the further we look ahead, the less clear things become. It's hard to make sense of the idea of obligations to people one million or ten million years in the future.

(2) If we have obligations to future people, to what do they oblige us?

Golding's short answer is that we have just one obligation: "...an obligation to produce -- or attempt to produce -- a desirable state of affairs for the community of the future, to promote conditions of good living for future generations". If we identify specific obligatory acts or kinds of acts, then these must be seen as derivative, in the sense that we do them because we are acting on the original general obligation to promote good future conditions for living. Golding draws an analogy between this obligation and the general responsibility parents have to their children. What specific actions are required will be context dependent.

(3) What kind of obligation are obligations to future people?

Golding characterizes obligations to future people as being implied by "presumptive rights." These are rights future people have because of legitimate claims against us. That is, there is something we are obliged to do for the people of the future.

Some further problems now need addressing. The first is the well known problem of trying to say why or how we could have obligations to people who do not yet exist. One problem here is how it can be held that we have obligations where nothing is claimed (i.e., by future people). Golding notes that three is no necessary connection between obligations and claims -- obligations do not require claims, and claims are not sufficient to establish obligations. What we need to do is determine if it can be held that future people are part of our moral community.

Golding talks about different kinds of moral communities. We need not worry about this claim [which seems to me to presuppose something important about what moral theory is assumed]. There are two ways in which we usually think moral communities are formed: (1) by explicit contract, and (2) by an implicit social arrangement from which members derive direct mutual (i.e., reciprocated) benefits. However, a moral community of us and future people cannot be formed in either of these ways. A third option is to think that a community could be form with those to whom we have altruistic impulses. If we can identify with what is good for future people, then we can form a community with them.

Now that the conceptual work has been done, the question remains: Do we have obligations to future generations? Golding does not think that there is a clear affirmative answer to this question, for some key reasons.

1. If what is necessary to form a community with future people is a sense of a shared life, it becomes apparent that the more distant in the future people are, the less likely we are to form such a community, and so have obligations.
2. Moreover,the further we look to the future, the less we can know about what people will want -- that is, what goods we are obligated to provide.
3. Because of this lack of knowledge, it may be that what we might think is good will turn out to be bad. And given this ignorance, perhaps we are obliged to do nothing, so as to avoid doing something that will end up being contrary to their good.

Finally, many claim that a key obligation we have to future generations is to curb population growth, and perhaps even reduce population. Golding does not see how we could have such an obligation, because it would in effect require actions that would determine the membership of future generations. [Note: others have argued the other way -- i.e., that if we have any obligations to future people it must at least be to bring them into existence. Further, that if we are to be Utilitarian, we should bring into existence as many people as possible -- perhaps within the limits of maximizing utility.]

Derek Parfit

Parfit begins with the assumption that current actions have good or bad consequences for future people. Given this, it does not matter that certain future people that might be harmed by current actions do not yet exists.

If we consider isolated acts, it is reasonable to assume that (most) single acts will not affect who will exist (see the nuclear waste technician example). It is then reasonable to directly connect current specific acts with specific future harms, and so link responsibility for these harms to current people. However, if we consider not isolated acts but general policies adopted by a society, it seems clear that such policies will affect who exists. Why? First, that we are who we are is a consequence of being born of two specific parents at a particular time. [Let's ignore the alternative view Parfit outlines.] Second, key policies (like the "Risky Policy") affect things like standards of living and other social, political, and economic aspects of our lives. These things further affect marriages and the timing of conceptions, thereby affecting who will be born. If we look far enough into the future -- hundreds of years -- it is plausible to assume that key policies could radically affect future populations. [Think, for instance, of certain immigration policies.]

Consider now Parfit's risky energy policy. It made life slightly better for us and our descendants, but it resulted in the deaths of thousands of people 200 years later. But, was adoption of the policy worse for anyone? No doubt some were harmed by being killed, and some harmed by being injured or by having loved ones killed or injured. But these people would not have existed if we did not adopt the policy. Assuming their lives were worth living, it would appear that they were made better off by the adoption of the policy. Parfit asks: Do we benefit someone by causing him or her to exist? Even though the answer may not be clear, it seems that they must. So even though the policy killed some people, it nonetheless benefited them.

This result looks counterintuitive; in considering isolated acts, it seems it matters what we do, and the technician in Parfit's example does do something wrong. But in considering the adoption of policies that affect who is born, it seems it does not matter what we do (or at least, our action is not wrong). As Parfit notes, however, this follows only if we assume that "wrongs require victims." Parfit denies this.

Parfit claims that our choices about policies that affect people in the future must matter morally, and that this is true even though no actual people in the future are made worse off by our choices. This is because there is a difference in the quality of life between those who do end up existing and those who would otherwise have existed. [Maybe we would call this 'Temporal Possibilities Utilitarianism.] If we compare the overall well being of the people in the two groups -- those who will exist if we adopt the policy vs. those who will exist if we do not -- the best decision, morally, is to not adopt the policy.

The upshot is that we are still morally to blame for current actions that have negative consequences in the future (again, even though no actual people in the future are made worse off). We are responsible not only for actual events but also for predictable events. So, current acts that cause environmental damage or deplete resources are wrong not because we would be acting against the interests of the people in the future. Rather, they are wrong because we bring about less well being, considered independent of who will actually exist. The underlying principle is:

"[And act] is bad if those who live are worse off than those who might have lived". [See p. 294]

Parfit ends with a practical point. Given that most erroneously think that it would be wrong to adopt a policy because it would harm future people (assuming that it would), should we just not inform people of the personal identity point? That is, perhaps we should just not tell them about the idea, which seems true, that even a very environmentally destructive policy would not make actual people worse off (because they would have at least had some kind of life they would not have otherwise had). As Parfit notes, this looks dishonest, but it may produce the best overall consequences. [The same kind of reasoning is run in other Utilitarian situations.]